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plaintiff's cause of action is endangered because attempts to satisfy
a shifting standard will leave the plaintiff uncertain about the valid-
ity of nail and mail service.' 5 Since the alternative method of nail-
ing and mailing is reasonably calculated to apprise defendants of an
action, there should be no renitence to construing due diligence
liberally.' 6
Maureen A. Glass
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101(a)(4): Pre-subpoena motion required to compel disclo-
sure by nonparty witness
CPLR 3101 (a) (4) authorizes full disclosure of all necessary and
material evidence by "any person where the court on motion deter-
mines that there are adequate special circumstances."''0 While
v. Macy, 236 N.Y. 412, 140 N.E. 938 (1923); Knox v. Beckford, 167 Misc. 200, 3 N.Y.S.2d
718 (Albany City Ct. 1938), aff'd per curiam, 258 App. Div. 823, 15 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dep't
1939), aff'd per curiam, 285 N.Y. 762, 34 N.E.2d 911 (1941). The rationale for not allowing a
6-month extension where personal jurisdiction does not exist is that if service was improper,
the suit was never commenced and thus there was no prior action to which the provisions of
the statute could apply. Eisenthal v. Schatzberg, 39 Misc. 2d 330, 240 N.Y.S.2d 547 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1963). See generally CPLR 205(a), commentary at 196 (1972); 1 WK&M
$ 205.11. One commentator, however, maintains that if the defect is technical only and the
defendant receives actual notice, the 6-month extension should apply. See SIEGEL § 52, at 54
(citing Amato v. Svedi, 35 App. Div. 2d 672, 315 N.Y.S.2d 63 (2d Dep't 1970)). Although it
was unnecessary to resolve the issue, the Court of Appeals recently pointed out that this
position conflicts with its holding in the Smalley case. George v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d
170, 178, 390 N.E.2d 1156, 1160-61, 417 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236 (1979).
"I' The harsh consequences of retroactively applying a new standard of due diligence
could be mitigated if the plaintiff were granted a 6-month extension under 205(a). See gener-
ally note 104 supra.
Where the plaintiff was not on notice regarding the requirements of due diligence, it is
suggested that the defect could be considered "technical" so that CPLR 205(a) would apply
under the facts in Barnes. See id.
"IS CPLR 308 creates a "hierarchy of alternative means of service." Dobkin v. Chapman,
21 N.Y.2d 490, 502, 236 N.E.2d 451, 457, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161, 170 (1968). Due diligence is the
mechanism used to guarantee that methods which are most likely to give the defendant notice
will be used in the first instance. If the preferred methods of personal delivery and delivery
and mail are seriously attempted, but to no avail, nail and mail service seems to be
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances," Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950), to give the defendant notice.
101 CPLR 3101(a)(4) provides:
There shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecu-
tion or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof, by:
(4) any person where the court on motion determines that there are adequate
special circumstances.
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some courts have interpreted the provision to delimit the scope of
disclosure, ' others have used it to establish the procedure for ob-
taining the oral deposition of a nonparty witness.'"' Notwithstand-
ing the statutory language indicating the necessity of a motion,
nonparty witnesses have been routinely subpoenaed without court
orders."10 Recently, however, in Kurzman v. Burger,"' the Supreme
Court, New York County, held that CPLR 3101(a)(4) requires an
The "material and necessary" phrase of CPLR 3101(a)(4) is derived from its predecessor,
CPA § 288. In an effort to emulate the more liberal federal standard, the draftsmen of the
CPLR abandoned these qualifiers and substituted the broader criterion of "all relevant evi-
dence and all information reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence." FrosT REP. 117;
see SIEGEL § 344, at 420-21. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b). The legislature, however, rejected
the "relevance" language and reinstated the "material and necessary" limitation of CPA §
288. SIEGEL § 344, at 420-21. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals in Allen v. Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968), held that the
material and necessary test should be "one of usefulness and reason." Id. at 406-07, 235
N.E.2d at 432, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 452. In effect, the Allen Court established a "relevance"
standard, setting the tone of liberal construction for all disclosure devices, in accordance with
the original intent of the Advisory Committee on practice and procedure. See CPLR 3101,
commentary at 11 (1970); SIEGEL § 344, at 421; 3A WK&MvI 3101.07, at 31-37.
The "special circumstances" requirement of CPLR 3101(a)(4) is a holdover from § 288
of the CPA. Early decisions under the CPLR held that the requirement could be met by a
showing of hostility in a witness. See, e.g., Polisar v. Linz, 39 App. Div. 2d 544, 331 N.Y.S.2d
742 (2d Dep't 1972); In re Estate of Macku, 29 App. Div. 2d 539, 285 N.Y.S.2d 973 (2d Dep't
1967). More recent cases, however, construe the test to require only a "mere showing" that
the witness's pretrial deposition is necessary to prepare fully for trial. E.g., In re Catskill
Center For Conservation and Dev., Inc. v. Voss, 63 App. Div. 2d 1091, 416 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883
(3d Dep't 1979) (mei.); Villano v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 118, 120,
361 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (1st Dep't 1974); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 41 App. Div. 2d 586,
586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (4th Dep't 1973). Thus, the "special circumstances" and "material
and necessary" standards appear to be similar, if not identical. See generally CPLR 3101,
commentary at 11, Supp. at 8 (1970 & Supp. 1979-1980). The liberal construction of the
special circumstances rule is consistent with the Court of Appeals decision in Allen. See
CPLR 3101, commentary at 26 & 27 (1970); 3A WK&M 3101.32, at 31-89.
IS See Muss v. Util. & Indus. Corp., 61 Misc. 2d 642, 642, 305 N.Y.S.2d 540, 541 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1969); Bush Homes, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 61 Misc. 2d 495, 496,
305 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648, (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969); CPLR 3101, commentary at 7 (1970);
SIEGEL § 344, at 420; 3A WK&M 3102.01, at 31-159 to -160. In Bush, the court noted that
CPLR 3101(a)(4) was not meant to establish procedural rules, but to define the scope of
disclosure generally. 61 Misc. 2d at 496, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 648. Taking this view, the remainder
of Article 31 deals with the various methods of implementing disclosure. See CPLR 3101,
commentary at 7 (1970); SIEGEL, § 344, at 420; 3A WK&M 3102.01, at 31-159.
I See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Atheneum Publishers, Inc., N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1976, at
6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County); Granoffv. Ayerst Laboratories, N.Y.L.J., January 29, 1975,
at 15, col. 8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
CPLR 3106(b) sets forth the power to subpoena nonparty witnesses for disclosure pur-
poses while Rule 3107 requires the examining litigant to give notice of the time and place of
the examination to all necessary participants. See SIEGEL § 351, at 436.
"I E.g., Gates v. State, 72 Misc. 2d 844, 846, 339 N.Y.S.2d 568, 571 (Ct. Cl. 1972); CPLR
3101, commentary at 28 (1970); SIEGEL § 351, at 436.
" 98 Misc. 2d 244, 413 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
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attorney to proceed by motion in the first instance when seeking to
depose a potential nonparty witness."2
In Kurzman, the plaintiff served a nonparty with a subpoena
in order to obtain his oral deposition." 3 In response, the defendant
moved for a protective order under CPLR 3103 to vacate the sub-
poena, claiming that no "adequate special circumstances" justified
examining the nonparty."4 Without reaching the defendant's con-
tention, the court quashed the subpoena as a violation of the
"express mandate" of CPLR 3101(a)(4) to proceed initially by mo-
tion.'15
Presiding Justice Egeth initially emphasized that Kurzman
should not be interpreted as a retreat from the trend toward liberal-
ized disclosure, but as an effort to clarify the proper method of
obtaining pretrial examination."' Reasoning that CPLR 3101(a)(4),
3106(b) and 3107 should be construed as a cumulative statement of
the procedure for nonparty disclosure, the court found that the sta-
tutory scheme demands an application to the court prior to the
issuance of a subpoena." 7
"1 Id. at 244-45, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
" Id.; see CPLR 2301 (1974).
11 98 Misc. 2d at 244-45, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 609. A court, in its discretion, may issue a
protective order to limit, condition, regulate or bar the use of any disclosure device. CPLR
3103 (1970). The provision states that it is "designed to prevent unreasonable annoyance,
expense, embarassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts." Id.
The language indicates that the CPLR framers intended to accord the provision a broad
policing function over the entire disclosure proceedings. See CPLR 3103, commentary at 298
(1970). As the draftsmen suggested, "[tihere is no limit but the needs of the parties or the
nature of the order or the conditions of discovery." FIRST REP. 124; see CPLR 3103, commen-
tary at 298 (1970); 3A WK&M 3103.01, at 31-192 to -201.
"1 98 Misc. 2d at 245, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
' Id., 413 N.Y.S.2d at 609-10. The court specifically noted the liberal standard for
disclosure established in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d
430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968), and the generous criterion applied in determining the adequacy
of special circumstances pursuant to CPLR 3101(a)(4). Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 41
App. Div. 2d 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300 (4th Dep't 1973). Id.; see note 107 supra.
H' 98 Misc. 2d at 246, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 610. Justice Egeth emphasized that the following
statutes should be read collectively:
(CPLR) 3101(a)(4) - "any person where the court on motion determines that there
are adequate special circumstances."
(CPLR) 3106(b) - "Witnesses. Where the person to be examined is not a party...
he shall be served with a subpoena. Unless the Court orders otherwise, on motion
.. .such subpoena shall be served at least ten days before the examination."
(CPLR) 3107 - "A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral
examination shall give to each party ten days notice unless the court orders
otherwise. . ....
Id. (emphasis added by the court). In considering 3101(a)(4) separately, the Kurzman court
also found it necessary to require a motion. Id. Whether construed together or independently,
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The Kurzman court also found that the absence of a prelimi-
nary motion places an unfair burden upon a nonparty witness."5
Discovery without motion to the court would force a nonparty either
to ignore the subpoena and hazard a contempt charge' or seek a
protective order and bear the expense and inconvenience of litiga-
tion fees. 2 1 Moreover, a nonparty witness seeking a protective order
would be required to guess at the object of his examination and
speculate on the "appropriate grounds to justify the invalidation of
the subpoena.''2 By requiring a motion setting forth the grounds
upon which discovery is sought, however, Justice Egeth reasoned
that a court would be able to excise specious claims. In addition,
the burden of coming forward would be placed upon the party best
fitted to that role - the examining litigant. 22
In light of the dearth of judicial precedent in this area, the
Kurzman case marks a significant step in the evolution of nonparty
disclosure procedure. It is submitted, however, that CPLR
3101 (a) (4) was not intended to enumerate specific procedural rules,
but to "state in general terms what may and may not be the subject
of disclosure."'2 The court's literal reading of CPLR 3101(a)(4) re-
the court determined that the requirement of a motion was needed "[t]o give full effect to
[subsection (a)(4) of CPLR 3101], and to implement its full meaning in a context with the
other statutory provisions . . . ." Id.; see Bonito Maritime Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins.
Co., 68 App. Div. 2d 864, 414 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1st Dep't 1979) (Fein, J., concurring).
"1 98 Misc. 2d at 248, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12. Justice Egeth's strict interpretation of
CPLR 3101(a)(4) appears to have been strongly influenced by several opinions authored by
Justice Fein while a member of the Supreme Court, New York County. See Simon & Schus-
ter, Inc. v. Atheneum Publishers, Inc., N.Y.L.J., May 4, 1976, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County); Granoff v. Ayerst Laboratories, N.Y.L.J., January 29, 1975, at 15, col. 8 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County). In cases decided after Kurzman, Justice Fein has continued his literal con-
struction of CPLR 3101(a)(4). See Plummer v. R.H. Macy & Co., 69 App. Div. 2d 765, 414
N.Y.S.2d 921 (1st Dep't 1979) (Fein, J., concurring); Bonito Maritime Corp. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 68 App. Div. 2d 864, 414 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1st Dep't 1979) (Fein, J., concur-
ring).
"1 98 Misc. 2d at 248-49, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 612. CPLR 2308(a) (1974) provides in pertinent
part: "Failure to comply with a subpoena issued by a judge, clerk or officer of the court shall
be punishable as contempt of court." Id. Included within this ambit is the subpoena issued
by an examining attorney to a nonparty witness. CPLR 2308, commentary at 247 (1974). The
disobedient party is also liable to the examining party for any actual damage his noncompli-
ance causes. CPLR 2308(a) (1974); see SIEEL § 385, at 503.
1" 98 Misc. 2d at 249, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 612; see Bonito Maritime Corp. v. St. Paul
Mercury Ins. Co., 68 App. Div. 2d 864, 865, 414 N.Y.S.2d 1022, 1023 (1st Dep't 1979) (Fein,
J., concurring).
' 98 Misc. 2d at 249, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
I2 Id. The court believed that the burden should rest on "a party with a financial stake
in the action" and not "upon the noninvolved nonparty who most often has no financial stake
in the outcome of the litigation." Id.
123 Bush Homes, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 61 Misc. 2d 495, 496, 305 N.Y.S.2d 646,
648 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969); see 3A WK&M 3101.33, at 31-92; note 107 supra.
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quiring a motion in the first instance appears inconsistent with the
policy considerations underlying the disclosure provisions of Article
31 and deficient in providing the protection to a nonparty witness
which the decision envisions. The express intent of the CPLR fra-
mers in enacting the disclosure article was to "prevent overburden-
ing [the] courts with a large number of motions. . ." and establish
"maximum control and supervision of litigation by the parties
rather than the courts. ' ' 121 Indeed, the drafter's intentions could be
effectuated without doing violence to the precise wording of CPLR
3101(a)(4) by use of the broad safeguards built into the protective
order mechanism of Article 31 .125
While CPLR 3101(a) (4) states that court review is necessary to
establish the existence of special circumstances, "a mere showing by
an attorney that the deposition is necessary to prepare fully for
trial" will apparently satisfy this requirement.12 6 Indicative of the
124 FIRST REP. 114. A primary disadvantage of compelling a preliminary application by
motion is the inefficient use of judicial time it engenders. See Spector v. Antenna & Radome
Research Assocs. Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 569, 569-70, 267 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (2d Dep't 1966).
Under the rule mandating an initial motion, where a nonparty witness or adverse party moves
for a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103 the court would be required to reexamine
evidence which, for the most part, it had already passed upon. As the Spector court stated,
"what might have been determined in one sitting will have required two determinations with
at least part, if not all, of the previous motion papers subject to an unnecessary review." Id.
at 570, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 844; accord, Bush Homes, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 61 Misc. 2d
495, 496, 305 N.Y.S.2d 646, 648-49 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1969). By examining the ade-
quacy of the special circumstances only upon motion for a protective order after subpoena,
the court avoids unnecessary duplicity and maintains intact the rights of the nonparty. See
Gates v. State, 72 Misc. 2d 844, 846-47, 339 N.Y.S.2d 568, 571 (Ct. C1. 1972) (citing Spector
v. Antenna & Radome Research Assocs. Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 569, 267 N.Y.S.2d 843 (2d
Dep't 1969); note 114 supra.
Justice Egeth also predicated the necessity of a preliminary motion on the ground that
it is a useful mechanism to prevent attorneys from examining a plethora of witnesses. 98 Misc.
2d at 249, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 612. The protective order, issued as a result of a motion by an
adverse party or, far more rarely, by the court sua sponte, can effectively and more efficiently
curb this potential abuse. See FIRST REP. 124; SIEGEL § 353. Since the adverse party normally
applies for the protective order on the witnesses' behalf, id., the recalcitrant witness often
will be relieved of the burden and expense of litigation. On balance, it appears that the
protective order can serve the primary functions ascribed to a presubpoena motion while
obviating its major disadvantage of needlessly increasing motion practice.
123 See note 114 supra. The language of CPLR 3101(a)(4) identifying a "motion" can be
interpreted as referring to a motion for a protective order made subsequent to the issuance
of a subpoena rather than as a procedural requirement for a presubpoena application to the
court. This construction is consistent with the general tenor of Article 31, which allows
discovery to proceed with minimal court involvement and with maximum control by the
parties. See note 124 & accompanying text supra.
lu Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 41 App. Div. 2d 586, 586, 340 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (4th
Dep't 1973) (quoting CPLR 3101, commentary at 27 (1970)); see In re Catskill Center for
Conservation and Dev., Inc. v. Voss, 63 App. Div. 2d 1091, 416 N.Y.S.2d 881, 883 (3d Dep't
1979); note 107 supra.
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generous construction normally accorded motions for disclosure,'2
this inclusive definition makes it highly unlikely that an examining
attorney's motion will be denied. Thus, the protection afforded a
nonparty witness under the Kurzman rule appears minimal.28 The
intention of the CPLR draftsman would seem to be better served by
shifting the burden of coming forward to the adverse party or poten-
tial witness. By adjudicating a motion for a protective order, the
court can effectively and efficiently determine the adequacy of the
special circumstances.12 9 In this light, the Kurzman court's interpre-
tation dictating a pre-subpoena motion appears too rigid.
Michael G. Glass
ARTICLE 32 - ACCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3212: Unconditional summary judgment may not be granted
against unpleaded cause of action asserted in plaintiff's submissions
in response to motion
Under CPLR 3212, summary judgment must be denied upon a
showing sufficient to require a trial on any factual issue."' Whether
I" See note 107 supra; SEGEL § 344, at 421; 3A WK&M 3101.04, .07, .08.
123 Since a motion for a subpoena usually will be granted, see note 107 supra, it appears
that dispensing with the motion will be the most economic mechanism for articulating com-
plaints and correcting abuses. The Kurzman court's reading of CPLR 3101(a) (4) to require a
court order in every instance, however, seems wastefully nonselective in its breadth. See
CPLR 3101, commentary at 28 (1970). The protective order, on the other hand, appears to
be a better mechanism for judicial review because, by its nature, it would be invoked discrimi-
nately.
I" See note 128 supra.
110 CPLR 3212(b) (Supp. 1979) provides:
A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the
pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions.
The affidavit. . . shall show that there is no defense to the cause of action or that
the cause of action or defense has no merit. The motion shall be granted if, upon
all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be estab-
lished sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in
favor of any party.
To move successfully under CPLR 3212(b) a party must show all the necessary evidentiary
facts and prove that, as a matter of law, no defense is available to preclude relief in his favor.
In order to defeat the summary judgment motion, the opposing party must show facts "having
probative value sufficient to demonstrate an unresolved material issue." 4 WK&M 3212.12;
see, e.g., Piedmont Hotel Co. v. A.E. Nettleton Co., 263 N.Y. 25, 188 N.E. 145 (1933);
Cattonar v. Edward Ermold Co., 279 App. Div. 564, 107 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1st Dep't 1951).
Where damages is the only triable issue, or the basis of the motion is one of the grounds
set forth in CPLR 3211(a) or (b), the court may order an immediate trial on those issues.
